People of the Philippines vs. Morante

G.R. No. 187732, November 28, 2012

Ponente: Leonardo – De Castro, J.:

Facts:

Version of the prosecution: Morante was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of violation of section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and 6 counts of rape as defined in Art.266-A of the RPC. It was alleged that Morante taking advantage of the minority of AAA who was 12 years old and of his moral ascendancy and influence over her as a common law husband mother unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force and intimidation with lewd designs fondle the breast of AAA, kiss her and took other unwarranted liberties of her body which degraded and demeaned her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. A separate charged of six counts of rape is likewise filed. The prosecution presented AAA as the witness, her birth certificate and medical certificate by Dr. Richard Viray. AAA testified that despite living with the family in close quarters, the accused repeatedly violated her all the while threatening to kill her if she made noise or reported the incident to anyone else. It was corroborated by the findings of Dr. Viray, stating that there are lacerations found on the examination.

Version of the Defense: Accused denied the charges against him. Stating that AAA, BBB, and CCC the aunt of AAA have harbored ill-feelings against him and disclaimed that he had no knowledge of any sexual abuse against AAA, because AAA infact worked as a helper in Bocaue, Bulacan and it was impossible for him to do anything against AAA. Aside from the fact that he treated AAA as his own daughter.

The trial court despite convicted him of the crime charged.

Issue:

Whether appellant’s guilt of the crime charged was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because of the alleged inconsistencies of AAA’s testimony.

Ruling:

No. The appeal must be dismissed for lack of merit. The SC reiterates the jurisprudential principle of affording great respect and even finality to the trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses. Besides, inconsistencies of the victim’s testimony do not impair her credibility, especially if the inconsistencies refer to trivial matters that do not alter the essential facts of the commission of the crime of rape. It is also notable that AAA was able to reconcile such inconsistency during the re-direct examination when she explained the same. A rape victim is not expected to make errorless recollection of the incident that is so humiliating and painful that she might in fact be trying to obliterate it from her memory. Thus a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimonies of the offended party.

People of the Philippines vs. Llanita and Buar

G.R. No. 189817, October 3, 2012

Ponente: Leonardo – De Castro

Facts:

Version of the Prosecution: Appellants were convicted for violation of Sec. 5, Art 11 of R.A. No. 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 for illegal sale of Dangerous drugs. The prosecution presented PO2 Catuday as a witness a member of the PNP- Anti- Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force with functions to conduct buy-bust and surveillance operations. He was on duty when a female informant alias Inday went to the station to give info about the illegal drug activities of one Alias Reyna. A team was the immediately formed by Lt. Bartolazo to conduct a buy bust operation against Reyna. Buy bust ensued, from there PO2 Catuday introduced himself as a police officer. Llanita and Buar tried to escape but they were immediately apprehended, and were apprised of their constitutional rights. Specimens were forwarded to crime laboratory for examination, and the result yielded to a positive result for shabu.

Version of the Defense: Llanita testified that she was with her live in partner Buar in their house located at Daang Hari, Taguig City when a member of unknown persons introduced themselves as police officers and unlawfully barged in to their home and entered without search warrant. They also vehemently denied the ownership over the shabu.

Despite 3 informations were filed against them, and was found them guilty.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in convicting the appelants despite the fact that the prosecution failed to overthrow the constitutional presumption of innocence and for failure to establish a cautious and unbroken chain of custody of evidence.

Ruling:

No. Because what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. He commission of illegal sale merely requires the consummation of the selling transaction, which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. As long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer, whose offer was accepted by appellant followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former, then the crime is already consummated. Examinations of the testimony of PO2 Catuday reveals that the elements of illegal sale are present to attain the conviction of Llanati and Buar. In this case the prosecution has amply proven all the elements of the drug sale with moral certainty. And for the proper chain of custody it was also clearly proven that there was a cautious chain of it.

People of the Philippines vs. Brainer

G.R. No. 188571, October 10, 2012

Ponente: Leonardo- De Castro, J.

Facts:

Version of the Prosecution: The accused was found guilty for violation of Se. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known as the comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Information was filed against Brainer for unlawfully and knowingly selling one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings MMB containing one point zero three three (1.033) grams of shabu which is a dangerous drug. She pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. The prosecution presented their defense based on the testimonies of PO2 Gatdula and Police Inspector Reyes the forensic chemist officer. Prior to the buy bust operation a confidential informant apprised Gatdula that a certain Cacay was looking for shabu buyer. Buy bust ensued after forming a team for entrapment with a coordination report faxed to the PDEA.

Version of the Defense: Brainer testified that she agreed to accompany her friend patty to the Holy Trinity Church, since patty had a quarrel to her husband and that she asked Brainer to talk to her husband. Brainer was about to leave the church when somebody held her and told her not to run. She was the put in a small room after, her personal belongings like wallet, bracelet, watch and shoes were taken and alleged that cops were asking for a money as an extortion and that failure to produce the amount of 300,000.00 php led her to the city jail.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime charged on the basis of the uncorroborated testimony of PO2 Gatdula and on the basis of the perceived flaws in the evidence of the defense.

Ruling:

No. There is no merit on the appeal. This court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of the witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which if considered might affect the result of the case. The court finds no reason to deviate from the foregoing rule. It was also proven by the prosecution that the successful elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs was established namely; 1) The establishment of the identity of the buyer, the seller, the object and the consideration. 2) The delivery of the things sold and payment therefore. All of these elements are indeed established from the moment the buy bust was conducted.

The demand of money by the police as being used by Brainer in exchange of her freedom is just a standard defense of the accused. She however utterly failed to prove any ill motive on PO2 Gatdula’s part which would have spurred the police officer to falsely impute a serious crime against Brainer. She was not able also to present a clear and convincing evidence of frame up and extortion to overturn the presumption of PO2 Gatdula regularly performing his duty.

People of the Philippines vs. Basao

G.R. No. 189820, October 10, 2012

Ponente: Leonardo- De Castro, J.

Facts:

Version of the Prosecution: Accused appellant together with seven identified co-accused plus 3 unidentified persons were charged for robbery with violence against/ imtimidation of persons by a band. The accused took and carried away from the spouses Yasumitsu Yasuda Hashiba and Emilie Lopio Hashiba cash money amounting to 48,000.00 php and other personal belongings of jewelries amounting to 78,000.00 php against their consent to the damage and prejudice of the spouses. A separate information was also filed against the accused for unlawfully kidnapping Yasumitsi Yasuda Hasiba to an undisclosed place for the purpose of extorting ransoms where he was detained and deprived of his liberty for more then 5 days. On trial, Emilie Hashiba testified that while at their home cooking for supper, 5 men entered their house with gun pointed to her younger brother. She identified the armed men except one who was wearing bonnet mask and although she did not know their names, she was able to recognized them during trial. Both Emilie and Crisologo identified the three accused appellants in court. Yasumitsu was also supposed to give testimony but was unable because of lack of competent Japanese interpreter, thus because of lack of evidence the prosecution moved for the dismissal of the charges. The RTC granted the same. Some of the accused were then acquitted but Rolando and Jovel remained for the positive identification being indicted by Emilie.

Version of the Defense: Accused Rolando and Jovel denied the charges. They maintained that they did not kidnap the Japanese national and that they did not also car napped the car of the victim because it was in fact Emilie who volunteered for them to use the same and in fact she had given them the car key. They denied the truth of the testimonies of Emilie and Crisologo.

Despite the trial court render its decision finding Jovel Aople, Rolando Apole and Renato Apole guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Robbery in Band. On appeal CA affirmed the decision with modification as to the penalties imposed.

Issue:

Whether the court a quo gravely erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses despite their inherent incredibility’s and irreconcilable inconsistencies’ and for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Ruling:

As consistently adhered to by this court, the matter of assigning values to declaration on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on the record. Consequently, the settled rule is that when the credibility of the witnesses is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of probative weight thereof are accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. It is truer if such findings were affirmed by the appellate court, since it is already binding upon this court. For the above alleged inconsistencies, it is found that they are just minor and inconsequential importance. Both witnesses agreed and identified the three accused appellants to have been the armed male factors. Testimonies of the victims were straight forward and there was no showing of any ill motive on their part to falsely testify against accused appellants. Positive identification of the accused were categorical and consistent.

People of the Philippines vs. De Los Reyes, et. al.

G.R. Nos. 130714 and 139634, October 16, 2012

Ponente: Leonardo- De Castro

Facts:

Go was convicted of two counts of rape. It was stated that Imelda the complainant upon request of her sister Carla went to the house of Go to bring some pictures. Upon arrival Imelda saw Go at the road outside his house talking to another man, introduced later to her as Val De Los Reyes. It rained and so suddenly, the 3 of them took shelter inside Go’s house. Imelda was forced to drink 2 bottles of beers causing her to feel dizzy, until Val succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her will, thereafter Go took his turn, aided by al by covering the mouth of Imelda and holding her hands. Imelda then filed two separate informations. The RTC convicted the appellants of two counts of rape. Through counsel, Val appealed and the court en banc rendered a decision vacating the conviction of Val, upon finding that RTC violated sec. 1, 2, Rule 132 and Sec.1 Rule 133 of then Revised Rules of Court requiring that the testimonies of the witnesses be given orally.

Issue:

Whether there is a necessity of transferring these cases to the CA for immediate review.

Ruling:

No. Since the records reveal that the appellant jumped bail during the proceedings before the RTC and was in fact tried and convicted in absencia. There is already dearth of evidence showing that he has since surrendered to the court’s jurisdiction. Thus he has no right to pray for affirmative relief before the courts. Once an accused escapes from prison/ confinement, jumps bail as in appellants case or flees to a foreign country, he loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief there from. Thus even if the court were to remand these cases to CA for immediate review the CA would only be constrained to dismiss appellants appeal as he is considered a fugitive from justice. Sec 8 Rule 124 of the Rules of Court is relevant which provides for Dismissal of Appeal for Abandonment or Failure to Prosecute.

People of the Philippines vs. Alejandro Violeja Y Asartin

G.R. No. 177140, October 17, 2012

Ponente: Leonardo- De Castro

Facts:

Version of the Prosecution: The trial court found Alejandro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Statutory Rape as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the RPC. The rape involved in this case was committed before the amendment of Art. 335 of the RPC by R.A. No. 8353 or the Anti- Rape Law of 1997. Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty and trial ensued. Evidence of the prosecution shows that private complainant Vea was only 10 years old when the incident took place. Accused was the common law husband of the mother of Vea. The victim narrated that appellant forced to insert her penis to her vagina and sometimes appellant entered the room and instructed Vea to suck on his penis. It was also recalled by the victim that every time her mother is leaving the house for town accused would enter their room and have carnal knowledge with her. Accused appellant however admitted to the mother that he repeatedly molested her child. From then Vea run away from home, after which the victim and her mother lodged a complaint to the barangay and police authorities. Victim was examined by Dr. Pang and testified that there are indeed lacerations.

Version of the defense: Appellant invoke alibi in his defense. Instead he testified that he once saw a man on top of Vel, Vea’s mother and saw Vea playing outside the house with his kids and that near Vea was a naked man lying down face and because of the incident he saw he turned away from home. And when he decided to go home he was arrested and mauled by Barangay official causing his consciousness and it was only in the municipal jail that he had regained the same.

Despite the trial court convicted him of the crime charged.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in not giving credence to the accused defense of alibi and in giving credence to the testimonies of the Prosecution’s witnesses.

Ruling:

No. Since it is a settled jurisprudence that in a prosecution for rape, the accused maybe convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is credible, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. The court affirms the ruling of the lower courts that the elements of rape are indeed present in the case at bar. The victims clear and credible testimony coupled with the corroboration made by the medical findings of Dr. Pangs point positively to the conclusion that appellant indeed committed the crime of rape attributed to him. The defense of alibi is not likewise proper because he must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within the immediate vicinity. Appellant failed to established to established the distance between the corn plantation where he is working and the house where the rape occurred.

People of the Philippines vs. Marcial Malicdem

G.R. No. 184601; 12 November 2012

PONENTE: Leonardo-De Castro

SUBJECT:  Murder

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution:

On the night of August 11, 2002 in Brgy. Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan Bernardo Casullar, Joel Concepcion and the victim, Wilson Molina were seated near the artesian well when appellant arrived asking if they knew the whereabouts of his godson Rogelio Molina. They answered in the negative. They noticed that appellant was reeking of alcohol and as they stood to leave, appellant suddenly embraced Wilson and lunged a six-inch knife to the left part of his chest. A scuffle then ensued between the four men. Appellant then ran away. Afterwards, Joel brought Wilson aboard a police patrol car to the Region I Medical Center in Dagupan City where Wilson was declared dead on arrival.

Version of the Defense:

            On the night of August 11, 2002, appellant and his wife Anabel Malicdem were looking for their godson Rogelio Molina as they were about to have dinner. The couple passed by the artesian well where Bernardo, Joel and Wilson were loitering. Appellant inquired from the three if they had seen Rogelio and they replied no. When appellant voiced his observation that the three were drunk, he was hit with a bottle by Bernardo and a fistfight ensued. Appellant alleged that it was the victim who brought out the knife. They grappled for the knife and appellant was able to throw the victim, who was holding the knife, to the ground and accidentally landed on the said knife causing his death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused can invoke self-defense which would warrant his acquittal

HELD:

No, For the Court to consider self-defense as a justifying circumstance, appellant has to prove the following essential elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. The Court has repeatedly stated that a person who invokes self-defense has the burden to prove all the aforesaid elements. The Court also considers unlawful aggression on the part of the victim as the most important of these elements. Thus, unlawful aggression must be proved first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete. The defense failed to discharge its burden to prove unlawful aggression on the part of Wilson by sufficient and satisfactory proof. The records were bereft of any indication that the attack by Wilson was not a mere threat or just imaginary. Bernardo, Joel and Wilson were just in the act of leaving when appellant suddenly plunged a knife to Wilson’s chest.

            Moreover, appellant’s act of suddenly stabbing Wilson as he was about to leave constituted the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

            The appellant was convicted of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Dela Torre-Yadao, et al.

G.R. No. 162144-54 ; 13 November 2012

PONENTE: Del Abad

FACTS:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police’s Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, then headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11 suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved. On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan. On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack

of probable cause to hold the accused for trial following the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.

The case was reopened in March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s petition on the ground of double jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to try the case. It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge Yadao.  Yadao in 2003 junked the murder case against Lacson and other police officials for lack of probable cause.On March 3, 2004 the prosecution filed the present special civil action of certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable cause

HELD:

            The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the motions for determination of probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records. The SC held that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.

            The prosecution The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to “immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.

            In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

People of the Philippines vs. Benjamin Soria

G.R. No. 179031 ; 14 November 2012

PONENTE: Del Castillo

SUBJECT:Rape

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution:

The victim, AAA, is the daughter of the accused. On February 26, 2000, AAA and her siblings enjoyed the spaghetti their father brought home for merienda. After eating, AAA went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant also entered the room and positioned himself on top of AAA, took off her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it was painful. At that point, appellant apologized to his daughter, stood up, and left the room. The whole incident was witnessed by AAA’s brother, BBB. The pain persisted until AAA’s vagina started to bleed. She thus told her aunt about it and they proceeded to a hospital for treatment. Her mother was also immediately informed of her ordeal. AAA was taken into the custody of the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

Version of the Defense:

Appellant admitted that he was at home on the day and time of AAA’s alleged rape but denied committing the same. Instead, he claimed that the filing of the rape case against him was instigated by his wife, whom he confronted about her illicit affair with a man residing in their community. According to appellant, he could not have molested AAA because he treated her well. In fact, he was the only one sending his children to school since his wife already neglected them and seldom comes home.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which would warrant his acquittal

HELD:

            Rape can now be committed either through sexual intercourse or by sexual assault. Rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A is referred to as rape through sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge is the central element and it must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, rape under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A is commonly known as rape by sexual assault. The perpetrator commits this kind of rape by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

            The RTC and the CA found the accused guilty of rape through sexual intercourse but It is evident from the testimony of AAA that she was unsure whether it was indeed appellant’s penis which touched her labia and entered her organ. AAA stated that she only knew that it was the “bird” of her father which was inserted into her vagina after being told by her brother BBB. Clearly, AAA has no personal knowledge that it was appellant’s penis which touched her labia and inserted into her vagina. Hence, it would be erroneous to conclude that there was penile contact based solely on the declaration of AAA’s brother, BBB, which declaration was hearsay due to BBB’s failure to testify.

The court however found it inconsequential that AAA could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. Moreover, the prosecution satisfactorily established that appellant accomplished the act of sexual assault through his moral ascendancy and influence over “AAA” which substituted for violence and intimidation. Thus, there is no doubt that appellant raped AAA by sexual assault.

It is also improbable for appellant’s wife to have dared encourage their daughter AAA to file the charges publicly expose the dishonor of the family unless the rape was indeed committed.

Accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape by sexual assault and is also ordered to pay AAA civil indemnity and damages.

Rodolfo Belbis jr. and Alberto Brucales vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 181052; 14 November 2012

PONENTE: Peralta

SUBJECT: Homicide

FACTS:

Version of the Prosecution:

Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. On the night of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house to do his rounds. At around 10:00 p.m., Veronica Dacir, Jose’s live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her name and went to where Jose was and saw blood at his back and shorts. It was there that Jose told Veronica that he was held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was brought to Albay Provincial Hospital where he was confined for 6 days. Jose was brought back to the hospital on January 7, 1998 and it was found out that his kidneys had inflamed due to infection. He died the next day.

Version of the Defense:

            Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in engaged in a conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their way home, they heard Jose’s whistle go off as the latter was following them. Rodolfo asked Jose what is the matter and the latter replied, “What about?” Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on Rodolfo, but the latter was able to evade it. The night stick was actually a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. Rodolfo and Jose grappled for the bolo while Alberto was merely shouting at them to stop. Rodolfo eventually got hold of the bolo but he suffered a wound in his hand so Alberto took him to the hospital.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations of the accused is credible to cast a reasonable doubt which would warrant his acquittal

HELD:

          No, petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists that he had done the deed to defend himself. It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he killed the victim.

The unlawful aggression, a requisite for self-defense, on the part of the victim ceased when petitioner Rodolfo was able to get hold of the bladed weapon. Rodolfo, who was in possession of the same weapon, already became the unlawful aggressor. Furthermore, the means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. In the present case, four stab wounds to the back of the victim are not necessary to prevent the alleged continuous unlawful aggression from the victim as the latter was already without a weapon.

Moreover, the fact that there is a lapse of time from the incident and the death of the victim is not controlling since what really needs to be proven in a case when the victim dies is the proximate cause of his death. It can be concluded from the doctors’ testimonies that without the stab wounds, the victim could not have been afflicted with an infection which later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his death. The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the victim. The petitioners are found guilty of homicide.

FE H. OKABE, Petitioner,

v.

ERNESTO A. SATURNINO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 196040               August 26, 2014

PONENTE: Peralta

FACTS:

                The subject of the controversy is an 81 square meter property located in Makati City, which was initially covered by TCT No. 175741 under the name of the wife of respondent Ernesto A. Saturnino. Sometime in 1994, the couple obtained a loan with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), which was secured by the subject property. Because of the couple’s failure to settle their loan obligation with the bank, PNB extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage.

                On August 24, 1999, the Certificate of Sale was inscribed on TCT No. 175741. Considering that the property was not redeemed by respondent during the redemption period, consolidation of ownership was inscribed on October 13, 2006 and a new TCT was issued in favor of PNB. Without taking possession of the subject property, PNB sold the land to petitioner Fe H. Okabe on June 17, 2008. TCT No. 225265 was later issued in petitioner’s name on August 13, 2008.

                On November 27, 2008, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession over the subject property.

                The RTC ruled, among other things, that the right of the petitioner to be placed in absolute possession of the subject property was a consequence of her right of ownership and that petitioner cannot be deprived of said possession being now the registered owner of the property. Meanwhile, on November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner, which granted her ex-parte petition and ordered that the corresponding writ of possession over the subject property be issued in her favor.

                The CA reversed RTC’s decision and opined, among other things, that although it may be true that by virtue of the contract of sale, petitioner obtained the same rights of a purchaser-owner and which rights she derived from erstwhile mortgagee turned owner PNB, this does not mean that the right to file an ex-parte motion for a writ of possession under Act 3135 had also been transferred to the petitioner. Such a special right is granted only to purchasers in a sale made under the provisions of Act 3135.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not an ex-parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession was the proper remedy of the petitioner in obtaining possession of the subject property.

HELD:

                NO.  Section 7 of Act No. 3135,28 as amended by Act No. 4118,29 states:

Section 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in the form of an ex parte motion x x x and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue, addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

                Under the provision cited above, the purchaser or the mortgagee who is also the purchaser in the foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period, upon an ex-parte motion and after furnishing a bond.

GC Dalton Industries, Inc. v. Equitable PCI Bank: the Court held that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is summary and ministerial in nature as such proceeding is merely an incident in the transfer of title.

China Banking Corporation v. Ordinario: the Court held that under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to possession of the property.

Spouses Nicasio Marquez and Anita Marquez v. Spouses Carlito Alindog and Carmen Alindog:  although the Court allowed the purchaser in a foreclosure sale to demand possession of the land during the redemption period, it still required the posting of a bond under Section 7 of Act No. 3135.

                It is thus settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the said property and can demand it at any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new transfer certificate of title.

When bond required

                The buyer can in fact demand possession of the land even during the redemption period except that he has to post a bond in accordance with Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended. No such bond is required after the redemption period if the property is not redeemed. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon proper application and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.

                Here, petitioner does not fall under the circumstances of the aforequoted case and the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended, since she bought the property long after the expiration of the redemption period. Thus, it is PNB, if it was the purchaser in the foreclosure sale, or the purchaser during the foreclosure sale, who can file the ex-parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession during the redemption period, but it will only issue upon compliance with the provisions of Section 7 of Act No. 3135.

Remedy of purchaser subsequent to the foreclosure sale purchaser

                Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given. – If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1) year from the date of registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall be executed by the officer making the sale or his successor in office, and in the latter case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in office and executed it.

                Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.

When issuance of writ of possession is ex-parte and non-adversarial

                From the foregoing, upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment debtor to the property, and its possession shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment debtor. In which case, the issuance of the writ of possession ceases to be ex-parte and non-adversarial.

When issuance of writ of possession requires hearing

                Thus, where the property levied upon on execution is occupied by a party other than a judgment debtor, the procedure is for the court to conduct a hearing to determine the nature of said possession, i.e., whether or not he is in possession of the subject property under a claim adverse to that of the judgment debtor.

Summary of rules

                It is but logical that Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court be applied to cases involving extrajudicially foreclosed properties that were bought by a purchaser and later sold to third-party-purchasers after the lapse of the redemption period. The remedy of a writ of possession, a remedy that is available to the mortgagee-purchaser to acquire possession of the foreclosed property from the mortgagor, is made available to a subsequent purchaser, but only after hearing and after determining that the subject property is still in the possession of the mortgagor. Unlike if the purchaser is the mortgagee or a third party during the redemption period, a writ of possession may issue ex-parte or without hearing. In other words, if the purchaser is a third party who acquired the property after the redemption period, a hearing must be conducted to determine whether possession over the subject property is still with the mortgagor or is already in the possession of a third party holding the same adversely to the defaulting debtor or mortgagor. If the property is in the possession of the mortgagor, a writ of possession could thus be issued. Otherwise, the remedy of a writ of possession is no longer available to such purchaser, but he can wrest possession over the property through an ordinary action of ejectment.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

TRINIDAD A. CAHILIG, Appellant.

G.R. No. 199208               July 30, 2014

PONENTE: Carpio

TOPIC: Qualified Theft

FACTS:

                Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (WPESLAI). She was tasked with handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.

                It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the funds ofWPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAI’s bank accounts then transfer these funds to its other bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferringfunds from one bank account to another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said amount from her capital contribution.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not Cahilig was guilty of qualified theft.

HELD:

                YES. The elements of Qualified Theft, committed with grave abuse of confidence, are as follows:

1. Taking of personal property;
2. That the said property belongs to another;
3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.

                All the elements are present in this case.

                Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to commit the theft.

Grave abuse of confidence, defined

                Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, “must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the appellant abused.”

                Cahilig’s position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves “handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing” money from WPESLAI’s depositors and other funds of the association. Cahilig’s responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.

                However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that Cahilig did not deny.

GRACE CHRISTIAN HIGH SCHOOL, represented by its Principal, DR. JAMES TAN, Petitioner,

v.

FILIPINAS A. LAVANDERA, Respondent.

G.R. No. 177845               August 20, 2014

PONENTE: Perlas-Bernabe

TOPIC: Retirement pay benefits

FACTS:

                Filipinas was employed by petitioner Grace Christian High School (GCHS) as high school teacher since June1977, with a monthly salary of 18,662.00 as of May 31, 2001.

                On August 30, 2001, Filipinas filed a complaint for illegal (constructive) dismissal, non-payment of service incentive leave (SIL) pay, separation pay, service allowance, damages, and attorney’s fees against GCHS and/or its principal, Dr. James Tan. She alleged that on May 11, 2001, she was informed that her services were to be terminated effective May 31, 2001, pursuant to GCHS’ retirement plan which gives the school the option to retire a teacher who has rendered at least 20 years of service, regardless of age, with a retirement pay of one-half (½) month for every year of service. At that time, Filipinas was only 58 years old and still physically fit to work. She pleaded with GCHS to allow her to continue teaching but her services were terminated, contrary to the provisions of Republic Act No. (RA) 7641, otherwise known as the “Retirement Pay Law.”

                LA dismissed the illegal dismissal case but found the retirement benefits payable under GCHS plan to be deficient. NLRC reversed LA’s award and held that retirement pay should be computed based on her monthly salary at the time of her retirement. CA modified NLRC’s decision and ruled that the computation of “one-half month salary” by equating it to”22.5 days”.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the multiplier “22.5 days” is to be used in computing the retirement pay differentials of Filipinas.

HELD:

                YES. RA 7641, which was enacted on December 9, 1992, amended Article 287 of the Labor Code, providing for the rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment. The said law states that “an employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining agreement (CBA)]and other agreements shall not be less than those provided” under the same – that is, at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year – and that “unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.”

Applicability of the 1/2 month salary provision

1. There is no CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees, or
2. There is a CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits but it is below the requirement set by law.

                Verily, the determining factor in choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits provided.

                In the present case, GCHS has a retirement plan for its faculty and non-faculty members, which gives it the option to retire a teacher who has rendered at least 20 years of service, regardless of age, with a retirement pay of one-half (1/2) month for every year of service. Considering, however, that GCHS computed Filipinas’ retirement pay without including one-twelfth (1/12) of her 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of her five (5) days SIL, both the NLRC and the CA correctly ruled that Filipinas’ retirement benefits should be computed in accordance with Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7641, being the more beneficent retirement scheme. They differ, however, in the resulting benefit differentials due to divergent interpretations of the term “one-half (1/2) month salary” as used under the law.

Elegir v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.:  “one-half (1/2) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus 2.5 days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for SIL.”

                The Court sees no reason to depart from this interpretation. GCHS’ argument therefore that the 5 days SIL should be likewise pro-rated to their 1/12 equivalent must fail.

                Moreover, the Court held that the award of legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount of P68,150.00 representing the retirement pay differentials due Filipinas should be reckoned from the rendition of the LA’s Decision on March 26, 2002 and not from the filing of the illegal dismissal complaint.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner,

vs.

CYNTHIA E. CABEROY, Respondent.

G.R. No. 188066               October 22, 2014

PONENTE: Reyes

TOPIC: Oppression (administrative) and Sec. 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019 or the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”

FACTS:

                Caberoy is the principal of Ramon Avanceña National High School (RANHS) in Arevalo, Iloilo City. She was charged with Oppression and Violation of Section 3(e) and (f) of RA No. 3019 or the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act” by Tuares for allegedly withholding her salary for the month of June 2002.

                The Ombudsman found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002 because of her failure to submit her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST), while the other teachers received their salaries for the same month. The Ombudsman concluded that Tuares was “singled out by respondent Caberoy as the only one who did not receive any amount from the school on June 2002 because, as established earlier, the former failed to submit her clearance and PAST.”

ISSUE:

                Whether or not Caberoy is guilty of Oppression and violation of Sec. 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019.

HELD:

                NO. Caberoy was charged with oppression and violation of RA 3019, however, the Ombudsman, found Caberoy guilty only of Oppression. Thus, the Court need not discussed the violation of RA 3019.

                Oppression is an administrative offense21 penalized under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

                Oppression is also known as grave abuse of authority, which is a misdemeanor committed by a public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm, imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. To be held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority, there must be substantial evidence presented proving the complainant’s allegations. Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

                Evidently, from the foregoing disquisitions, respondent Ombudsman contradicted itself when it found and held that petitioner was guilty of “oppression” for not paying the private respondent her June 2002 salary, because as a matter of fact she has been paid albeit delayed. Such payment is clearly and indubitably established from the table where it was shown that private respondent received on July 17 and 25, 2002, her June 2002 salary in the amounts of P4,613.80 and P4,612.00, respectively.

                There was delay in the payment of salary because “it is a well-known fact that in the government service an employee must submit his daily time record duly accomplished and approved before one can collect his salary.”

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs

PETRUS YAU a.k.a. “John” and “Ricky” and SUSANA YAU y SUMOGBA a.k.a. “Susan”, Accused-Appellants.

G.R. No. 208170               August 20, 2014

PONENTE: Mendoza

TOPIC: Kidnapping for ransom

FACTS:

                On January 20, 2004, at around 1:30 in the afternoon, private complainant Alastair Onglingswam, who is a practicing lawyer and businessman from the United States, went out of Makati Shangrila Hotel, where he was billeted, and hailed a white Toyota taxi cab with plate number PVD-115 to take him from the said hotel to Virra Mall. While the said taxicab was plying along EDSA, and within the vicinity of SM Megamall, private complainant received a phone call from his associate Kelly Wei in Hong Kong. He noted that while he was on the phone conversing with his associate, appellant Petrus Yau, whom he noted to have short black hair, a moustache and gold framed eyeglasses, would from time to time turn to him and talk as if he was also being spoken to. Thereafter, he felt groggy and decided to hang-up his phone. He no longer knew what transpired except that when he woke up lying down, his head was already covered with a plastic bag and he was handcuffed and chained.

                When private complainant complained that the handcuffs were too tight, a man who was wearing a red mask and introduced himself as “John” approached him and removed the plastic bag from his head and loosened his handcuff. John informed him that he was being kidnapped for ransom and that he will be allowed to make phone calls to his family and friends. Hours later, John returned with telephony equipment, tape recorder, phone and a special antennae cap for the cellphone. With these equipment, private complainant was allowed to call his girlfriend and father and asked them for the PIN of his ATM cards and for money, however, with instructions not to inform them that he was kidnapped. A day after, he was told by his captor to call his girlfriend and father to tell them that he was still alive as well as to reveal to them that he was kidnapped for ransom and his kidnappers were demanding Six Hundred Thousand Dollars (US$600,000.00) as ransom and Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php20,000.00) a day as room and board fee.

                During private complainant’s twenty-two (22) days of captivity, while he was allowed to communicate with his family almost daily to prove that he was still alive and was served with meals almost five times a day either by John or the other accused Susan Yau, he was also maltreated i.e. beaten with sticks, made to lay-down biting a piece of wood which was made as target for a rifle.

                Complainant was rescued when members of the Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response Task Force (PACER) intercepted the same taxi with plate number PVD 115 and subsequently appellant led the team to his house where complainant was held captive.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not Petrus and Susana Yau were guilty of kidnapping for ransom

HELD:

                YES.

                The elements of Kidnapping For Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are as follows:

1. Intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty;
2. Actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and
3. Motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim.

All of the foregoing elements were duly established by the testimonial and documentary evidences for the prosecution in the case at bench.

1. Petrus is a private individual.
2. Petrus kidnapped Alastair by using sleeping substance which rendered the latter unconscious while inside a taxicab driven by the said accused-appellant.
3. Petrus took and detained Alastair inside the house owned by him and Susana Yau in Bacoor, Cavite, where said victim was handcuffed and chained, and hence, deprived of his liberty.
4. Alastair was taken against his will.
5. Petrus made demands for the delivery of a ransomin the amount of US$600,000.00 for the release of the victim.

Petrus is a principal and Susana is an accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom

It must be emphasized that there was no evidence indubitably proving that Susana participated in the decision to commit the criminal act. The only evidence the prosecution had against her was the testimony of Alastair to the effect that he remembered her as the woman who gave food to him or who accompanied his kidnapper whenever he would bring food to him every breakfast, lunch and dinner.

Requisites for a person to be an accomplice

1. That there be a community of design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose;
2. That he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and
3. That there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.

                In the case at bench, Susana knew of the criminal design of her husband, Petrus, but she kept quiet and never reported the incident to the police authorities. Instead, she stayed with Petrus inside the house and gave food to the victim or accompanied her husband when he brought food to the victim. Susana not only countenanced Petrus’ illegal act, but also supplied him with material and moral aid. It has been held that being present and giving moral support when a crime is being committed make a person responsible as an accomplice in the crime committed. As keenly observed by the RTC, the act of giving food by Susana to the victim was not essential and indispensable for the perpetration of the crime of kidnapping for ransom but merely an expression of sympathy or feeling of support to her husband.

People v. De Vera: where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.

IMASEN PHILIPPINE MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs

RAMONCHITO T. ALCON and JOANN S. PAPA, Respondents.

G.R. No. 194884               October 22, 2014

PONENTE: Brion

TOPIC: Sexual intercourse in workplace during work hours as serious misconduct

FACTS:

                Petitioner Imasen Philippine Manufacturing Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of auto seat-recliners and slide-adjusters. It hired the respondents as manual welders in 2001.

                On October 5, 2002, the respondents reported for work on the second shift – from 8:00 pm to 5:00 am of the following day. At around 12:40 am, Cyrus A. Altiche, Imasen’s security guard on duty, went to patrol and inspect the production plant’s premises. When Altiche reached Imasen’s Press Area, he heard the sound of a running industrial fan. Intending to turn the fan off, he followed the sound that led him to the plant’s “Tool and Die” section.

                At the “Tool and Die” section, Altiche saw the respondents having sexual intercourse on the floor, using a piece of carton as mattress. Altiche immediately went back to the guard house and relayed what he saw to Danilo S. Ogana, another security guard on duty.

                Respondent’s defense: they claimed that they were merely sleeping in the “Tool and Die” section at the time of the incident. They also claimed that other employees were near the area, making the commission of the act charged impossible.

                Both LA and NLRC held that the dismissal was valid. CA however nullified NLRC’s decision and held that sexual intercourse inside company premises is not serious misconduct.

ISSUE:

                Whether the respondents’ infraction – engaging in sexual intercourse inside company premises during work hours – amounts to serious misconduct justifying their dismissal.

HELD:

                YES. Sexual acts and intimacies between two consenting adults belong, as a principled ideal, to the realm of purely private relations. Whether aroused by lust or inflamed by sincere affection, sexual acts should be carried out at such place, time and circumstance that, by the generally accepted norms of conduct, will not offend public decency nor disturb the generally held or accepted social morals. Under these parameters, sexual acts between two consenting adults do not have a place in the work environment.

                Indisputably, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse inside company premises and during work hours. These circumstances, by themselves, are already punishable misconduct. Added to these considerations, however, is the implication that the respondents did not only disregard company rules but flaunted their disregard in a manner that could reflect adversely on the status of ethics and morality in the company.

                Additionally, the respondents engaged in sexual intercourse in an area where co-employees or other company personnel have ready and available access. The respondents likewise committed their act at a time when the employees were expected to be and had, in fact, been at their respective posts, and when they themselves were supposed to be, as all other employees had in fact been, working.

                The Court also considered the respondents’ misconduct to be of grave and aggravated character so that the company was justified in imposing the highest penalty available ― dismissal.

                Their infraction transgressed the bounds of socially and morally accepted human public behavior, and at the same time showed brazen disregard for the respect that their employer expected of them as employees. By their misconduct, the respondents, in effect, issued an open invitation for others to commit the same infraction, with like disregard for their employer’s rules, for the respect owed to their employer, and for their co-employees’ sensitivities.

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 170139               August 5, 2014

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC:  Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022

FACTS:

                Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.

                Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

                Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate repatriation.” Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.

                On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees

ISSUE:

                Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her salary due to illegal dismissal.

HELD:

                YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.

                In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

                A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It “confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.”

                The Court said that they are aware that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.

Ruling on the constitutional issue

                In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

                Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

                The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.

                The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510               September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

                The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6, 2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

                On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

                Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.
3. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

                Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

                In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications.1âwphi1 Such right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

                On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

                The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and Robling.

                During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

                In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes

                With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner, which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources, would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute. Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

                The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

                The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition for a writ of Kalikasan.

                The Court also found  unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

ARAULLO, et.al., Petitioners,

vs.

AQUINO, et.al., Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 209287,et.al.    January 3, 2015

(Motion for Reconsideration)

PONENTE: Bersamin

TOPIC: Constitutionality of DAP, cross-border transfer

RULING OF THE COURT:

1.) The Court’s power of judicial review

Argument: The respondents argue that the Executive has not violated the GAA because savings as a concept is an ordinary species of interpretation that calls for legislative, instead of judicial, determination.

Held: Untenable. The interpretation of the GAA and its definition of savings is a foremost judicial function. This is because the power of judicial review vested in the Court is exclusive.

Endencia and Jugo v. David: The interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

2.) Strict construction on the accumulation and utilization of savings

The exercise of the power to augment shall be strictly construed by virtue of its being an exception to the general rule that the funding of PAPs shall be limited to the amount fixed by Congress for the purpose. Necessarily, savings, their utilization and their management will also be strictly construed against expanding the scope of the power to augment.15 Such a strict interpretation is essential in order to keep the Executive and other budget implementors within the limits of their prerogatives during budget execution, and to prevent them from unduly transgressing Congress’ power of the purse.

Pertinent provisions

Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution states:

No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.

x x x x

Section 38 and Section 39, Chapter 5, Book VI of the Administrative Code provide:

Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. – Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act and whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, the President, upon notice to the head of office concerned, is authorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personal services appropriations used for permanent officials and

employees.

Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits.—Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may, with the approval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations: Provided, that the creation of new positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to be funded from budgetary savings except when specifically authorized by law: Provided, further, that whenever authorized positions are transferred from one program or project to another within the same department, office or agency, the corresponding amounts appropriated for personal services are also deemed transferred, without, however increasing the total outlay for personal services of the department, office or agency concerned.

Section 38 refers to the authority of the President “to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure of funds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act.” When the President suspends or stops expenditure of funds, savings are not automatically generated until it has been established that such funds or appropriations are free from any obligation or encumbrance, and that the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is authorized has been completed, discontinued or abandoned.

Although the withdrawal of unobligated allotments may have effectively resulted in the suspension or stoppage of expenditures through the issuance of negative Special Allotment Release Orders (SARO), the reissuance of withdrawn allotments to the original programs and projects is a clear indication that the program or project from which the allotments were withdrawn has not been discontinued or abandoned.

At this point, it is likewise important to underscore that the reversion to the General Fund of unexpended balances of appropriations – savings included – pursuant to Section 28 Chapter IV, Book VI of the Administrative Code does not apply to the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group (CFAG), which include the Judiciary, Civil Service Commission, Commission on Audit, Commission on Elections, Commission on Human Rights, and the Office of the Ombudsman.

On the other hand, Section 39 is evidently in conflict with the plain text of Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution because it allows the President to approve the use of any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in the GAA for programs and projects of any department, office or agency to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular appropriations. As such, Section 39 violates the mandate of Section 25(5) because the latter expressly limits the authority of the President to augment an item in the GAA to only those in his own Department out of the savings in other items of his own Department’s appropriations. Accordingly, Section 39 cannot serve as a valid authority to justify cross-border transfers under the DAP.

Augmentations under the DAP which are made by the Executive within its department shall, however, remain valid so long as the requisites under Section 25(5) are complied with.

3.) The power to augment cannot be used to fund non-existent provisions in the GAA

Argument: The respondents assert, however, that there is no constitutional requirement for Congress to create allotment classes within an item. What is required is for Congress to create items to comply with the line-item veto of the President.

Held: Tenable. The Court reversed its ruling.

Indeed, Section 25(5) of the 1987 Constitution mentions of the term item that may be the object of augmentation by the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice, and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. In Belgica v. Ochoa, we said that an item that is the distinct and several part of the appropriation bill, in line with the item veto power of the President, must contain “specific appropriations of money” and not be only general provisions.

Item, definition: the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill. an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a “line-item.” This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a “specific appropriation of money” but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same.

Accordingly, the item referred to by Section 25(5) of the Constitution is the last and indivisible purpose of a program in the appropriation law, which is distinct from the expense category or allotment class. There is no specificity, indeed, either in the Constitution or in the relevant GAAs that the object of augmentation should be the expense category or allotment class. In the same vein, the President cannot exercise his veto power over an expense category; he may only veto the item to which that expense category belongs to.

Further, in Nazareth v. Villar, we clarified that there must be an existing item, project or activity, purpose or object of expenditure with an appropriation to which savings may be transferred for the purpose of augmentation. Accordingly, so long as there is an item in the GAA for which Congress had set aside a specified amount of public fund, savings may be transferred thereto for augmentation purposes.

Nonetheless, this modified interpretation does not take away the caveat that only DAP projects found in the appropriate GAAs may be the subject of augmentation by legally accumulated savings. Whether or not the 116 DAP-funded projects had appropriation cover and were validly augmented require factual determination that is not within the scope of the present consolidated petitions under Rule 65.

4. Cross-border transfers are constitutionally impermissible

Argument: Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution prohibits only the transfer of appropriation, not savings.

Held:  Section 25(5) is clear. The Court stood by its previous pronouncement.

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs. 

ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 166357    January 14, 2015

PONENTE: Bersamin, J.

TOPIC: Psychological incapacity, Declaration of Nullity of Marriage

FACTS:

                In the case at bar, Kalaw presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.

                However, the Supreme Court in its September 19, 2011 decision dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground that there was no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not the marriage was void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

                YES. The Court in granting the Motion for Reconsideration held that Fernandez was indeed psychologically incapacitated as they relaxed the previously set forth guidelines with regard to this case.

Note: Molina guidelines were not abandoned, expert opinions were just given much respect in this case.

Guidelines too rigid, thus relaxed IN THIS CASE

                The Court held that the guidelines set in the case of Republic v. CA have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of “less specificity” obviously to enable “some resiliency in its application.” Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity “not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts” in recognition of the verity that no case would be on “all fours” with the next one in the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every “trial judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.

                In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.

Personal examination by party not required; totality of evidence must be considered

                We have to stress that the fulfillment of the constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accorded to a marriage that is null and void

ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.

                There is no requirement for one to be declared psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence, “if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.”

                Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence on the causation.

                Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.

Expert opinion considered as decisive evidence as to psychological and emotional temperaments

                The findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.

                The Court considered it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual premises.

                The Court also held that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the nullity of marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, “despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.”

Willfully exposing children to gambling constitutes neglect of parental duties

                The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her very young children.

                The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.

                The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB JN/TIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

Read the FULL TEXT.